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Abstract
We nd that the main featues of labor policy across OECD coun-
tries can be explained by a simple general equilibrium search model
with risk neutral agents and a government that chooses policy to max-
imize a social welfare function. In equilibrum, policies are chosen to
optimal redistribute income from advantaged to disadvantaged work-
ers. A worker can be disadvantaged in the sense that they may have
less ability to aquire and utilize skills in the workplace. The model
explains why passive benets tend to fall and active benets tend to
increase during the course of unemployment spell. The model also ex-
plains why countries that appear to pursue equity spend more on both
active and passive labor market programs.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of di¤erent social preferences on the optimal
characteristics of labor market policy. It develops a competitive search equi-
librium model with a government that pursues a combined goal of maximiz-
ing e¢ ciency and equity. Firms make irreversable investments in vacancies.
Workers are paid wages and choose to invest in skills. In this environment,
the optimal labor policy addresses two social concerns. The rst social con-
cern is that some workers have less ability to use and acquire the required
skills needed by employers.
We nd that our model can explain the main featues of labour policy
across OECD countries. Moreover, we are able to replicate these features
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c comments.
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about labor policy even though we assume risk neutral agents and a compet-
itive search equilibrium. Therefore, neither borrowing constraints nor wage
ine¢ ciencies are important to establishing our results.
A key feature of labor market policy that we seek to explain is the time
varying nature of active and passive subsidies. The observed methods of
delivering these benets suggest that the governments are targeting di¤erent
unemployment groups. On the one hand, passive subsidies target short-term
unemployed workers, because these benets are only of limited duration.
On the other hand, active benets target long-term unemployed workers,
because these instruments are generally implemented only after a signigant
unemployment spell. In other words, over the course of an unemloyment
spell, the passive benet given to unemployed workers tends to fall while
the active benet tends to rise.
We are also interested in understanding other facts about labor policies
in OECD countries. In particular, our model explains why some countries
spend signigant resources on both active and passive labor programs while
others do not. Consistent with this observation is the fact that high spending
countries appear to have better records.on income redistribution than low
spending countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a simple
directed search model with a government that wish to maximize a social
welfare function using a number of policy instruments. We begin our analysis
by investigating the optimal policy if the government is constrained to use
non-time varying policies. We then show that the social problem of low
productivity disadvantaged workers leads to a rising active benet during
extended periods of unemployment. Next, we show that the social problem
of ine¢ cient home producers leads to a falling passive benet over the course
of unemployment spell. The nal section of this paper o¤ers some concluding
remarks.
2 The model
The workforce consists of a total population of N innitely lived workers.
The workers are risk neutral with a subjective rate of time preference equal
to . Workers are distinguished in their ability i 2 fA;Dg to aquire and use
employment related skills.
Workers can choose to train, h = 1; or not, h = 0. For a worker of
type i , let yih denote the productivity during employment where y
i
1 > y
i
0.
Let the cost of training be ci   g units of output per period, where g is
a government subsidy to training. The training decision is modelled as a
decision to pursue a career that requires a constant investment in skills (as in
any balanced growth path). Therefore, higher productivity is achieved only
if the worker pays this cost each period regardless of employment status.
2
A worker that is unemployed enjoys a psychic benet to unemployment
in addition to the amount consumed. Let bj denote this benet and assume
that b bA > b bD.
2.1 Search and coordination friction
It is associated with frictions to get workers and jobs coordinated. Firms
have free entry and open job vacancies with a resource cost k per vacancy.
The job vacancies are directed towards specic types of labour, search is
directed, and each group of workers, distinguished by type and training in-
vestment, are in distinct submarkets with independently determined quan-
tities of vacancies. Matching in each submarket is random. Therefore, if v
job vacancies are opened, a job searcher in this submarket is approached by
a rm with probability
pi = 1  e ih ; i = A;D;
where ih = v
i
h=s
i
h; i = A;D is labour market tightness, that is, the ratio of
vi vacancies to sih job searchers in the submarket. We assume that all job
matches are destroyed with a common exogenous probability, :
2.2 Wage determination
Let i denote the present value of a match between a worker of human
capital level hi and a job vacancy. This present value is given by
ih =
yih   (c  g)hi + r(V ih +ih)
1  r(1  ) ;
where V i is the present value of a job searcher and i is the expected prot
of an unmatched job. Wages are determined by a simple labour auction
market (ref: Julien, Kennes and King 2000).1 Thus the present value V i of
a job searcher is given by
V ih = maxfV i(uih) + i(ih)(ih   V ih(uih)); 0g;
where ih(
i
h)  1 e 
i
h ihe 
i
h is the probability the worker has multiple
o¤ers and V i(ui) is the value of an unemployed worker. The value V i is the
reserve wageof each labour auction. The equilibrium present value of a
job vacancy is given by
ih = maxf k + e 
i
h(ih   V ih(uih)); 0g; (1)
1Specically, the auction implies that the entire surplus of a match goes to the rm
if the worker is matched with only one rm, and the entire surplus goes to the worker if
(s)he is matched with two or more rms. An unmatched agent gets zero.
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where the free entry of job vacancies ensures that i = 0. A worker that
leaves employment by a dislocation shock is a job searcher next period. The
value of such a worker is given by
V ih(u
i
h) = maxfb  (c  g)hi + rV ih ; 0g; (2)
where b denotes unemployment insurance benets.
All workers can choose to either train or not. The workers choice of
human capital maximizes the return to a worker that enters the workforce
unemployed. Thus
hi =

1
0
V i1  V i0
otherwise
: (3)
The values V i1 and V
i
0 are each determined by equation (3) for the ap-
propriate value of h.
2.3 The governments problem
Let WA and WD denote the average per period income of advantaged
and disadvantaged workers, respectively. Social welfare is determined by a
social welfare function, which takes as its arguments, WA,WD and . In
order to be able to incoorperate distributional issues, we assume that the
social welfare function has the following functional form:
Y = (WA + (1  )WD) + (1  )minfWA;WDg; 0    1;
which is a weighted average of a Benthamite sum of utilities social welfare
function and a Rawlsian social welfare function.
The government chooses transfers to unemployed and employed workers,
b and g, to maximize social welfare. The unemployment insurance, b; is
a passive benet, because the worker has complete freedom on how it is
spent. However, a general training subsidy, g; is an active measure in a
sense, because it has to be used on a specic activity, namely human capital
investment. Both transfers are paid by a lump sum tax, t. The government
balances its budget by setting
t = (buA + hAg) + (1  )(buD + hDg); (4)
where uA and uD indicate the unemployment rates of advantaged and disad-
vantaged workers and hA and hD are their respective human capital choices.
2.4 Equilibrium unemployment
We can now derive the equilibrium of the model. First we derive the unem-
ployment rate. Consider the gross labour market ows for a group of workers
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that have market tightness given by . The fraction of workers employed in
a period is given by
qt = zt + p()st;
where zt is the fraction of all workers that are employed because they did
not lose their jobs last period and p()st is the fraction of all workers that
are employed because of a successful job search this period. At the end of
each period each worker becomes unemployed with probability . Thus
zt = (1  )qt 1:
The ows in and out of employment imply that the steady state fraction of
workers engaged in job search in each period, sih , is given by
sih =

 + (1  )p(ih)
: (5)
Job searchers that do not nd a job are unemployed. Thus the unemploy-
ment rate is given by
uih = (1  p(ih))sih = e 
i
hsih: (6)
2.5 Job search and human capital
The per period income of a worker investing in human capital can be written
as follows
W ih = G
i
h   h(c  g)  t; i 2 fA;Dg; h 2 f0; 1g; (7)
where Gih is the workers labour market income as a function of their training
decision.
For each type of worker, i 2 fA;Dg; the training decision is determined
by the di¤erence between the cost of training, c   g, and the benet of
training, Gi1  Gi0. Thus the optimal value of h for each group of workers is
given by
h =

1
0
Gi1  Gi0  c  g:
otherwise
: (8)
Given that a competitive search equilibrium model matches jobs and
labour constrained e¢ ciently, the equilibrium is simple to derive if we as-
sume that the discount factor approaches unity (see Appendix 2). In par-
ticular, for each type of worker, equilibrium market tightness, ih  vih=sih,
is that which maximizes steady state output net of recruiting costs. Thus
the workerslabour market income is given by
Gih = max
ih

yih(1  uih) + buih   kvih
	
; i = A;D; (9)
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where uih = e
 ihsih and s
i
h = =

 + (1  )(1  e ih)

. Firms earn zero
prots. Thus all income net of the cost of vacancies goes to workers. In
competitive search equilibrium, this income is maximized and the solution
is
k =
yih   b
1  (1  )(1  (ih ))
e 
i
h ; (10)
where ih is the value of 
i
h that maximizes (9). .
In the following we characterise the optimal labour market policy, in
terms of optimal values of unemployment insurance b and a general training
subsidy g. In the following section we examine how the optimal values of
b and g varies with productivity levels of advantages and disadvantaged
workers.
3 The case for laissez faire policy
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium of the model allowing the
government a general training subsidy, g; in addition to its passive subsidy.
The problem is solved sequentially. We use the competitive equilibrium
allocation of jobs and skills derived above given a set of government transfers.
We can then solve for the optimal government transfers while taking the
decentralized (optimal) decision rules for jobs and human capital as given.
The government executes the transfers b; g and seeks to maximize the
social welfare function, hence the government
max
b;g
Y = (WA + (1  )WD) + (1  )minfWA;WDg; 0    1; (11)
such that (i) the government budget is balanced, equation (4) is satised
(ii) a participation constraint (PC) that all workers prefer participation to
benets
WAhA ;W
D
hD  b (12)
and (iii) the determination of WA
hA
and WD
hD
is given by the equilibrium
outcome of the decentralized economy, which is described above.
We rst establishes two results concerning the parameter, , where 1 
indicates the governmentssocial preferences. The solution to the govern-
ments problem yields the following propositions about optimal labour mar-
ket policy. Suppose that the government is only interested in wealth maxi-
mization, that is  = 1. In this case, we have the following result.
Proposition 1 If social welfare is determined solely by aggregate wealth
( = 1), optimal government is laissez faire.
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Proof. Competitive search equilibrium ensures that any subsidy to one
group of workers increases their output plus the subsidy an amount less than
the cost of the subsidy.
If market tightness and human capital decisions are constrained e¢ cient
given the search frictions, a wealth maximizing government never gives sub-
sidies that would distort these optimal decisions. Subsidies are only possible
if the government evaluates a unit of income spent by a disadvantaged worker
di¤erently than a unit of income spent by an advantaged worker, that is,
if  < 1. Still, a training subsidy that leads to the adoption of training by
both advantaged and disadvantaged workers is not optimal. This is shown
by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume  < 1: A rational government never subsidizes the
training of both advantaged and disadvantaged workers.
Proof. If all agents adopt training, the cost of the subsidy is completely
born by each group. Therefore, competitive search ensures that the optimal
subsidy is zero for both groups of workers.
The direct implication of proposition (1) and (2) is that an optimal
training subsidy must always exclude some workers, and it needs to be the
advantaged workers that do not get subsidized training as the governments
equity concern is the only possible motive for considering training. As we as-
sume that the government cannot condition transfers on a particular workers
type, the government will have to relay on self selection.
As g has no direct impact on labour market tightness we have the fol-
lowing results.
Proposition 3 Labour market tightness, ih ; is increasing in the produc-
tivity level yih, hence 
A
1 > 
A
0 > 
D
1 > 
D
0 .
Proof. ih is positive if yih   b > k. Likewise the right-hand side of
equation 10 is monotonically decreasing in ih and equal to zero if 
i
h is
large. Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium value of ih for each yih.
Hence for each b then ih increases in y
i
h. By the maximaisation problem (11),
b serves to modify but not circumvent the di¤erence inbetween advantanged
and disadvantaged workers.
Proposition 4 Unemployment is decreasing in productivity such that un-
employment is higher of disadvantaged trained workers than of advantaged
untrained workers, which again is higher than unemployment of advantaged
trained workers, uD0 > u
D
1 > u
A
0 > u
A
1 :
Proof. This follows from proposition (3) and equation (6) as unemploy-
ment decreases in labour market tightness.
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4 Complementarities between active and passive
spending
Suppose that the government seeks to direct the training subsidy to the
disadvantaged workers. This objective is met if the following two incentive
compatibility constraints (ICCs) are obeyed: WD1  WD0 and WA0  WA1 :
That is, the disadvantaged workers take up subsidized training while the
advantaged workers do not. More explicit, the constraints are,
GD1   (c  g)  GD0 (ICC(1))
GA0  GA1   (c  g) : (ICC(2))
The second incentive compatibility constraint implies that the maximum
active subsidy to disadvantaged workers is given by
gmax = c 
 
GA1  GA0

:
The behaviour of gmax is closely related to the amount spent on passive
subsidies as stated by the following proposition
Proposition 5 The maximum incentive compatible training subsidy for dis-
advantaged workers, gmax, increases as the passive subsidy, b, increases.
Proof. Comparative statics on equation (9) give @
 
GA1  GA0

=@b < 0
The rst ICC denes the minimum subsidy required to make disadvan-
taged workers train,
gmin = c 
 
GD1  GD0

:
Note that a government will subsidize a training programme only if
gmin  gmax:
This inequality is satised only if the marginal increase in labour pro-
ductivity is greater for disadvantaged workers than advantaged workers.
Proposition 6 If the government assigns a weight to equity ( < 1) and
disadvantaged workers are a su¢ ciently small part of the population ( is
close to one), then the constraint optimal training subsidy is gmax.
Proof. If  is large, any training subsidy given by the government that
does not lead to training by advantaged workers has virtually no e¤ect on
the level of taxation. In this case, the training subsidy can be treated purely
as a reduction in training costs for the disadvantaged. This subsidy raises
social welfare by an amount bounded away from zero if  < 1 with the
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welfare change of advantaged workers going to zero as  approaching unity.
If disadvantaged workers are a large portion of the population, the op-
timal training subsidy is not necessarily gmax. In this case, the result that
the e¢ ciency losses of training are small is not strictly valid. For example, if
disadvantaged make up the entire population, the optimal general training
subsidy is zero.
With a heterogenous population there is a case for a policy subsidizing
training but it is haltered by the fact that the government cannot discrimi-
nate between advantaged and disadvantaged. Although it is possible for the
government to sort workers by incentive compatible self-selection schemes,
this is still not providing a strong case for a training subsidy. Passive trans-
fers are still the most e¢ cient way of reducing income inequality in this case
as we will illustrate below.
Here we will also show that the picture changes dramatically if the gov-
ernment can use an extra piece of information like, for instance, the individ-
ual workers unemployment risk. Then all of a sudden, training subsidies be-
come an e¢ cient tool in providing equity. As the disadvantaged workers face
higher unemployment risk and thus are more likely to experience long-term
unemployment, all the information the government needs for implementa-
tion is the duration of any unemployed workers current unemployment spell
and then condition the training subsidies on the spell length.
There is, however, a complication to the use of unemployment experience
as a screening criteria. Under such a policy it becomes an issue for the
advantaged workers to try mimicking the disadvantaged workers in order to
get subsidized training. When the training subsidy is o¤ered unconditional
this is of course not an issue.
The government needs to make sure that advantaged workers do not pre-
fer subsidized training and long unemployment spells rather than no training
subsidy and short unemployment spells. The government does not need to
be concerned about the incentives of the disadvantaged workers as they sim-
ply cannot get re-employed fast enough to mimic the advantaged workers
and neither would they gain anything from conducting such a behaviour.
5 Why active benets are higher for the long-term
unemployed
Unemployment insurance is targeted to unemployed workers. Until now,
we have assumed that training of unemployed workers, the idea behind ac-
tive labour market programmes are not targeted to any particular group of
unemployed workers, only to the unemployed workers in general. We then
showed that it was optimal to set unemployment insurance and the train-
ing subsidy so as to prevent the already relatively advantaged workers from
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acquiring training.
The type of active programmes that many countries have implemented
are directed in particular, at the long-term unemployed workers. Hence, this
corresponds in our model to a general targeting of the the training subsidy
to the group of workers with the highest unemployment rate, that is the
disadvantaged workers. However, it may not be possible to disquinshish the
two worker types when o¤ering the training subsidy to unemployed work-
ers. Therefore, the government has to take into account that advantaged
workers may nd it optimal to mimic the disadvantaged workers when the
government constructs the optimal policy.
When training subsidies are targeted on the unemployed workers with
the highest unemployment rate, the government has to take into account
that advantaget workers may not signal their true type to the government
(disadvantaged workers cannot mimic the advantaged workers). LetWAh (u
0)
be the average income to an advantaged worker with training h who has
chosen unemployment u0: Now the government needs to make sure that the
advantaged workers do not want to be burdened with the unemployment rate
of trained disadvantaged workers uD1 just to get the training subsidy, but
rather prefer the unemployment rate of her own type uA0 ; that is, W
A
0 (u
A
0 ) 
WA1 (u
D
1 ):More explicitly, this ICC is y
A
0 (1 uA0 )+buA0  kvA0  yA1 (1 uD1 )+
buD1   kvD1   (c  g); where vD1 is the equilibrium vacancy in the submarket
for trained disadvantaged workers. Recall that yA0 (1   uA0 ) + buA0   kvA0 =
GA0 (u
A
0 ): Thus, written in a form compatible with the ICCs of the previous
section, we have,
GA0 (u
A
0 )  GA1 (uD1 )  (c  g): (ICC(2))
This constraint is more slack than the one needed in the previous section,
which was WA0 (u
A
0 )  WA1 (uA1 )): This is so, because WA1 (uA1 ) > WA1 (uD1 );
which follows from uA1 < u
D
1 corresponding to 
A
1 > 
D
1 , as 
i
h increases
in productivity. Hence if advantaged workers should mimic disadvantaged
workers, this corresponds to that they seem to have a lower productivity
and thereby experience a higher unemployment rate as fewer vacancies are
supplied.
Before we introduce the new ICC, (ICC(2)), into our model we will
make an important simplication in order to facilitate the evaluating of a
government training subsidies, which are targeted at workers who have a
higher risk of unemployment. Suppose that b is constant and that gj is
given by 0 if individual j is not in a training programme and g if j is being
activated, that is, in a training programme. Note that this assumption will
make the active transfers dependent on the equilibrium unemployment rate
We approximate the non-linear relationship between (i) the unemployment
rate of a particular type of workers and (ii) the average amount of active
training subsidies paid out to such workers by the following simple step-wise
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function
g(u) =

g
0
if
if
ui  u
otherwise
This is only a crude representation of training subsidy that is conditioned
on a su¢ cient unemployment duration. However, it should capture, to a
close approximation, the essential non-linearity between benet provision
and the equilibrium unemployment rate of each group when benets are
determined by unemployment duration. The per period income of a worker
investing in human capital is still given by equation (7) where now g is a
function of unemployment. Hence, the model is unchanged except that the
active transfer is paid only if the workers type observes a su¢ ciently high
unemployment rate. The equilibrium supply of jobs and human capital is
approximated by the following static welfare optimization problem. The
steady state welfare per worker per period of type i 2 fA;Dg is given by
Gih(u
) = max
h 2 f0; 1g
ih  0

yih(1  uih) + buih   (c  g)h  kvih
yih(1  uih) + buih   ch  kvih
if uih  u
otherwise
Maximizing Gi(u) gives a rst order condition which still is given by
equation (10). The equilibrium training decision is given by
h =
8>><>>:
1
0
1
0
if ui1  u and Gi1(u) Gi0  c  g ,
if ui1  u and Gi1(u) Gi0 < c  g ,
if ui1 < u
 and Gi1  Gi0  c;
if ui1 < u
 and Gi1  Gi0 < c:
The government can execute transfers b; g. The government seeks to
maximize the social welfare function
Y 0 = max
b;g;u
(WA + (1  )WD) + (1  )minfWA;WDg
such that the government balances its budget, that is fulls, equation (4).
The constraints on this maximization problem are the fact that b; g deter-
mine uA; uD; hA; hD by the equilibrium supply of jobs and human capital in
the previous subsection. Welfare is always higher than in the basic model
without targeted training, because activation gives the government an extra
instrument to solve the incentive compatibility problem. In particular, the
following policy menu is better.
1. For each value of the passive subsidy, a; compute the equilibrium un-
employment rate, u; of trained disadvantaged workers.
2. Calculate the payo¤s of (i) untrained advantaged workers and (ii) un-
subsidized trained advantaged workers when the unemployment rate
of advantaged workers is u:
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3. Set the subsidy of disadvantaged workers equal to the di¤erence of (i)
and (ii) in 2.
The reason this scheme outperforms the scheme in the previous section is
that the payo¤ of the unsubsidized constrained trained advantaged workers
in 2 is lower than the payo¤of unconstrained trained advantaged workers. In
particular, for a given passive subsidy, the incentive compatibility constraint
of active subsidies is weakened if they are targeted to the long term unem-
ployed. The fact that advantaged workers must mimic the unemployment
rate of disadvantaged workers (experience a large duration in unemploy-
ment), implies that a larger active subsidy can be paid to disadvantaged
workers. Therefore, an incentive compatible training subsidy can be paid
to disadvantaged workers even if the training yields signicant productivity
benets for advantaged workers, who will otherwise go untrained if training
is not subsidized.
In other words, we can show that, ceteris paribus, the impact on the
training subsidy, g, from increasing the unemployment insurance, b, is larger
in the targeted case than in the non-targeted case. All proofs are given in
the appendix.
Proposition 7 The impact on the training subsidy, g, from increasing the
unemployment insurance, b, is larger in the targeted case than in the non-
targeted case, that is, @g=@ajtargeted case>@g=@ajnon-targeted case.
6 Structural change
We now examine the optimal policy respons to skill biased and general
productivity shocks. First, we analyse skill biased productivity shocks a¤ect
optimal policy and unemployment rates when policy in not targeted. Then
we consider the impact of these shocks when policy is targeted.
6.1 Skill biased productivity shocks with non-targeted policy
The following proposition holds unless unemployment of disadvanted work-
ers is very high.
Proposition 8 When disadvantaged trained workers face a positive produc-
tivity shock, yD1 increasese, unemployment of all workers falls, the optimal
unemployment insurance and the optimal training subsidy fall. Unemploy-
ment distribution becomes less unequal. Unemployment insurance falls more
than the training subsidy
When disadvantaged workers face a positive productivity shock this has
a direct positiv e¤ect on labour market tightness and thereby their transition
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rate which direcly reduces unemployment for this worker type. Furthermore,
they are relatively better o¤ compared to their advantaged working fellows.
As the disadvantaged workers are the workers with the highest unemploy-
ment rates, them being in a better position implies that it is optimal to re-
duce unemployment insurance. The lower unemployment insurance implies
that labour market tightness of both type of workers increase and thereby
is unemployment reduced. The negative impact on disadvantage workers
unemployment rate is higher than the negative impact of advantaged work-
ers unemployment rate. Hence, distribution, in terms of unemployment,
become less unequal. It is then optimal to reduce the training subsidy. Fur-
thermore, the impact on unemployment insurance is larger than the impact
on training as the latter impact is weighted by the di¤erence inbetween the
unemployment rates of the advantaged workers.
Next we consider the impact on the economy from a productivity shock
for untrained advantaged workers
Proposition 9 When advantaged untrained workers face a positive produc-
tivity shock, yA0 increases, unemployment for disadvanted workers increases,
unemployment of advantaged workers falls, the optimal unemployment in-
surance increases and the optimal training subsidy increases. Unemployment
distribution becomes more unequal. Unemployment insurance most likely in-
creases less than the training subsidy.
When advantaged trained workers experience a productivity increase,
then labour market tightness facing those workers and thereby their transi-
tion rate increases. This in turn reduces their unemployment rate. Disad-
vantaged workers are therefore relatively worse o¤which makes it optimal to
increase unemployment insurance. This impact lowers the transition rate of
disadvantaged workers and therefore increases unemployment for this worker
type and inequality in terms of unemployment distribution worsens. As the
transition rate of untrained advantaged workers increases, it is relatively
more attractive to remain untrained. Hence, it is possible to increase the
training subsidy and still deter advantaged workers from acquiring train-
ing. Therefore, the training subsidy most likely increases more than the
unemployment insurance.
Finally, we consider the impact of a productivity increase for trained ad-
vantaged workers. In equilibrium unemployment insurance and the training
subsidy are set such that advantaged workers do not train. However, the
productivity of a trained advantaged worker raises the expected return and
thereby the incentives to acquire skills for advantaged workers. Therefore,
unemployment rates and optimal unemployment insurance and training sub-
sidies are a¤ected.
Proposition 10 When advantaged trained workers face a positive produc-
tivity shock, yA1 increases, unemployment for all workers increases, the op-
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timal unemployment insurance increases and the optimal training subsidy
falls where the di¤erence inbetween the two increases. Unemployment dis-
tribution becomes more unequal.
When the productivity of advantaged trained workers increases, their
transition rate would (if unemployment insurance and training subsidy are
set so as to eliminate this market) increase and the government has to dis-
courage advantaged workers from taking up training. They do so by increas-
ing unemployment insurance and reducing the training subsidy. The higher
unemployment insurance modies the needed increase in g. However, a
higher unemployment subsidy puts pressure on wages which reduces labour
market tigthness and thereby rises unemployment for both worker types.
The impact on unemployment for disadvantaged workers is higher than the
impact on unemployment of advantaged workers, whereby distribution in
terms of unemployment rates becomes more unequal.
6.2 General shocks when policy is non-targeted
When all workers face a positive producitivity shock the impact is as follows.
Proposition 11 When all workers are subject to a positive productivity
shock, unemployment for all workers fall, the impact on the optimal un-
employment insurance is ambiguous and the optimal training subsidy falls
whereby the di¤erence inbetween the two most likely increases.
When the productivity of all workers increases, all workers transition
rates increase and thereby unemployment of all workers fall. The impact on
unemployment insurance is ambiguous as disadvantaged trained workers are
better of due to the higher yD1 tending to reduce b and higher y
A tends to
increase b. Considering the training subisidy there is again several impacts.
A higher yA reduces the optimal g as the direct impact from yA1 which in-
creases the value of acquiring trainined as an advantaged workers dominates
the positive impact through b as employment is higher than unemployment.
The tendency to reduce the optimal unemployment insurance caused by a
higher yD1 tends to reduce the training subsidy which amplies the negative
impact on the optimal value of g.
6.3 Skill-biased Shocks when policy is targeted
When the productivity of disadvantaged trained workers increases, we ob-
serve the following.
Proposition 12 When disadvantaged trained workers face a positive pro-
ductivity shock, unemployment of all workers falls, the optimal unemploy-
ment insurance and the optimal training subsidy decrease. Unemployment
distribution becomes less unequal.
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When disadvantanged workers experience a positive productivity shock,
their transition rate increases and their unemployment rate therefore falls.
The higher productivity together with the higher transition rate reduces
unemployment insurance. This happens as disadvantaged workers are then
relatively better o¤. Lower unemployment insurance, in turn, raises the
transition rate of advantaged untrained workers which lowers their unem-
ployment rate. However, there is small modication of the reduction in
unemployment insurance as the higher transition rate for advantaged un-
trained workers also tend to increase the unemployment insurance a bit as
those workers, the workers being relatively best o¤, are even better o¤. The
impact on the training subsidy is negative covering two divergent e¤ects.
First, the higher transition rate of disadvantaged trained workers tends to
reduce the need for training subsidies. Second, the lower unemployment
insurance punishes the group with the highest unemployment rate, the
disadvantages workers, most severely and therefore this tends to increase
the optimal training subsidy. This latter e¤ect dominates such that the op-
timal training subsidy is reduced. We can show that the negative impact
on unemployment of the disadvantaged group of workers is higher than the
negative impact on unemployment facing advantaged workers which reduces
inequality in terms of unemployment rates.
Proposition 13 When advantaged untrained workers face a positive pro-
ductivity shock, unemployment for disadvanted and advantaged trained work-
ers increase, unemployment of advantaged untrained workers falls, the op-
timal unemployment insurance and the optimal training subsidy increases.
Unemployment distribution becomes more unequal.
When advantaged untrained workers become more productive, more va-
cancies are supplied and thereby their transation rate increases. Concen-
quently unemployment for untrained advantaged workers falls. The higher
transition rate induces unemployment insurance to increase, to compensate
the disadvantaged workers, as the advantaged workers, the workers being
relatively best o¤, are even better o¤. The higher unemployment insurance
imply that the transition rate of all trained workers decrease and thereby
unemployment of these workers increases which then increases inequality
measured in unemployment rates. There are three impacts on the training
subsidy. The higher productivity directly tends to increase the training sub-
sidy as being untrained becomes relatively more attractive. On the other
hand, higher unemployment insurance makes it relatively more attractive for
the advantaged to mimic the disadvantaged workers which tends to reduce
the optimal training subsidy. Finally, the negative impact on disadvantaged
workerstransition rate tends to increase the need for a higher subsidy. The
positive impacts dominate whereby the optimal training subsidy increases.
Proposition 14 When advantaged trained workers face a positive produc-
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tivity shock, unemployment for disadvanted trained and advantaged untrained
workers increase, the impact on unemployment of advantaged trained work-
ers is ambiguos, the optimal unemployment insurance increases and the im-
pact on optimal training subsidy is ambiguous. Unemployment becomes more
unequal.
Productivity increases for trained advantaged workers directly tend to
increase their transition rate. However, unemployment insurance has to
increase substantially to modify the relatively worse position of the disad-
vantaged trained and advantaged untrained workers. This will tend to re-
duce all transition rates. The overall impact on advantaged trained workers
transition rate is therefore ambiguous, but it is likely to increase. Concern-
ing the training subdidy there are several impacts.There is a direct negative
impact as the value of being trained increases. There is another negative im-
pact through the increase in unemployment insurance as unemployment of
disadvantaged trained workers is higher than unemployment of advantaged
untrained workers. Both impacts are negative as they both give incentives
to the advantaged workers to mimic the disadvantaged workers. There is
also a positive impact on g as the reduction of disadvantaged trained workers
transition rate reducing the attractiveness of training. The overall impact
is ambiguous. Finally, unemployment of disadvantaged workers increases
more than unemployment of advantaged workers, whereby the di¤erence
inbetween the two groups become even larger than before the shock.
6.4 General shocks when policy is targeted
Finally, we consider the case where both disadvantaged trained workers and
advantaged untrained workers experience a positive shock.
Proposition 15 When both disadvanted trained workers and advantaged
untrained workers experience a positive producitivity shock, unemployment of
all workers decrease, optimal unemployment insurance and training subsidy
fall. Unemployment distribution becomes more equal.
When the productivity of all workers increases, all workers transition
rates increase and thereby unemployment of all workers fall. The impact
on unemployment insurance is unambiguously negative as the impact from
a higher yD1 dominates the impact from a higher y
A. Hence, as the policy
is targeted, there is less need to increase b. Considering the training sub-
sidy we observe the following. A higher yA reduces the optimal g as the
direct negative impact from yA1 dominates the positive impact through b as
employment is higher than unemployment.
6.5 Discussion
All the impacts are summerised in the following table for convenience:
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Non-targeted case, e¤ects of productivity increases
increase in/e¤ect on b uD1 u
A
0 g u
D
1 =u
A
0
yD1          
yA1 + + +   +
yA0 + +   + +
yD1 ; y
A
0 ; y
A
1 ?        
Targeted case, e¤ects of productivity increases
increase in/e¤ect on b uD1 u
A
0 g u
D
1 =u
A
0
yD1          
yA1 + + + ? +
yA0 + +   + +
yD1 ; y
A
0 ; y
A
1          
7 Conclusions
The massive and persistent emphasis put on activation and training of unem-
ployed individuals in developed countries in general and in big-welfare-state
countries in particular is a puzzle, because it has been di¢ cult to identify
positive e¤ects - individual as well as macro-level e¤ects - from the often
huge spending on these programmes. This is surveyed by Martin (2000)
Heckman, Lalonde, Smith (1999) and OECD (2003). So either politics are
irrational or the profession has not been looking for e¤ects in the right
places. For instance, even if there are no e¤ects at the mean for any of the
programmes, there could be an e¤ect at the macro level - e.g., less inequal-
ity - if it is the more disadvantaged workers who gain productivity from the
programmes. This is conceivable as Martin (2000), Heckman, Lalonde, and
Smith (1999) and OECD (2004) also conclude that some programmes have
very signicant e¤ects for some groups of individuals. I OECD (2003) it is
also suggested that activation policies have reduced poverty rates in some
European countries.
Suppose income equality is a main objective for some countries along
side with high average income. Could it then be that active programmes
are favored by some countries because such programmes reduce inequality
e¢ ciently when used together with traditional passive programmes like UI
benets? This is the question that we have been discussing in this paper and
the answer is in the a¢ rmative. If income equality is a su¢ ciently strong
objective to a government then it might well be rational to implement active
training programmes for the long term unemployed together with passive
benet programmes like UI. This combination is far more e¤ective that
the combination of UI benets and a general education subsidy. At the
principal level, this could vindicate high spending on activation by countries
with strong taste for equity. Our results also suggests that high passive and
active spending goes hand in hand. Both these phenomenon can be observed
in the data for the OECD countries.
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These results are developed in a model with heterogenous workers, hu-
man capital investment, and unemployment. The model is "pure" in the
sense that laissez faireis e¢ cient: the privately chosen level of training is
e¢ cient and even though disadvantaged workers of low skills are the more
unemployed ones, unemployment is e¢ cient and reects search and match-
ing frictions. There are no externalities to justify training subsidies. We
have also deliberately disregarded the traditional insurance aspect of pas-
sive policies by letting agents be risk neutral in our model. So it is not the
usual missing insurance market that implies government spending on UI in
optimum. The redistributive functioning of UI in this model with heteroge-
nous unemployment risk is enough to have passive transfers to unemployed
entering the optimal policy packaged (of a government that maximizes a so-
cial welfare function that puts weight on both equity and income e¢ ciency).
Furthermore, not only can we explain the joint use of passive and ac-
tive subsidies, the model also shed light on the big variation in the labour
market policies of OECD countries. Our results suggest that much of the
variation in policy can be explained by di¤erent social objectives rather than
by ine¢ cient policy or di¤erences in technology and human capital.
The analysis of this paper can be improved in two directions. First, the
empirical assessment of the theory is only suggestive. An involved empirical
study is needed to isolate the specic causes of policy variation across OECD
countries. Second, the theory of the model could also be extended to
incorporate a more detailed description of active labour market programmes.
For example, di¤erent elements of active programmes, including di¤erent
subsidies for training employed and unemployed workers, could be studied.
We leave these improvements for further research.
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8 Appendix
This appendix establishes results used in the body of the paper.
8.1 Solution Equivalence
This appendix shows that the decentralized economy is equivalent to the
solution of a simple static maximization problem if the discount factor ap-
proaches unity. (1) The decentralized asset equations are given by
 =
y + (V +)
1  (1  )
 = 0
V = V (u) + (1  e    e )(  V (u))
 =  k + e (  V (u));
V (u) = a+ V
These equations for ; V; V (u); and  can rewritten to get a single expres-
sion for .
k = ye  + k(1  )(e  + e )
and that in the limit as  approaches 1 we get
k = ye  + k(1  )(e  + e ) (A1)
(2) Now consider the simple static problem of maximizing steady state out-
put less recruiting costs. In this case
W = max

y(1  u) + au  kv
such that
 = v=s
s =

 + (1  )(1  e )
u = s(1  e )
The solution to this problem is the same as A1.
19
8.2 Relative slopes, dg/db and signs.
The slope, dg=db in the targeted case is
dg
db
jtargeted case =
 
yA1   yD1
 uD1
1  (1  ) e D1
@D1
@yD1
+
 
uA0   uD1

>
 
yA1   yD1
 uD1
1  (1  ) e D1
@D1
@yD1
+
 
uA1   uD1

If yA1 = y
D
1 then
 
yA1   yD1
 uD1
1 (1 )e D1
@D1
@yD1
+
 
uA1   uD1

= 0. Increasing
yA1 then gives
@
 
yA1   yD1
 uD1
1 (1 )e D1
@D1
@yD1
+
 
uA1   uD1

@yA1
=  
 
uA1
2
1  (1  ) e A1
1
k
+
 
uD1
2
1  (1  ) e D1
1
k
> 0
(13)
Then
dg
db
jtargeted case > 0
The slope, dg=db in the non-targeted case is
dg
db
jnon-targeted case = uA0   uA1 > 0
Relative slopes:
dg
db
jtargeted case > dg
db
jnon-targeted case i¤ 
yA1   yD1
 uD1
1  (1  ) e D1
@D1
@yD1
+
 
uA0   uD1

> uA0   uA1 i¤
 
yA1   yD1
 uD1
1  (1  ) e D1
@D1
@yD1
+
 
uA1   uD1

> 0
which is positive by (13).
8.3 Non targeted policy
The equilibrium equations are
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yD1   b
1  (1  ) e D1  1 + D1 e D1   k = 0
yA0   b
1  (1  ) e A0  1 + A0 e A0   k = 0
yA1   b
1  (1  ) e A1  1 + A1 e A1   k = 0
(1  ) 

e D
1 (1 )e D   e
 A1
1 (1 )e A1




e 
A
0
2

1 (1 )e A0
3
k
+ (1  ) 

e 
D
1
2

1 (1 )e D1
3
k
= b
c+
 
yA0
1  e A0
1  (1  ) e A0 + b
e 
A
0
1  (1  ) e A0   k
A
0

1  (1  ) e A0
!
 
 
yA1
1  e A1
1  (1  b) e A1
+ b
e 
A
1
1  (1  ) e A1   k
A
1

1  (1  ) e A1
!
= g
8.3.1 Skill-biased shocks
Di¤erentiating the equilibrium equations with respect to D1 ; 
A
0 ; 
A
1 ; b; g,
yD1 ; y
A
0 and y
A
1 gives
dD1
dyD1
=
k
uA0

k
uA1
+ f

+ k
uA1

D1
> 0;
duD1
dD1
dD1
dyD1
< 0
dA0
dyD1
=  
k
uA1
m
D1
> 0 if m < 0;
duA0
dA0
dA0
dyD1
< 0
dA1
dyD1
=
  k
uA0
m
D1
> 0 if m < 0;
duA1
dA1
dA1
dyD1
< 0
db
dyD1
=
k
uA0
k
uA1
m
D1
< 0 if m < 0
dg
dyD1
=
 
uA0   uA1
 db
dyD1
< 0 dbdyD1
   dgdyD1
 =  1  uA0 + uA1   dbdyD1
 > 0
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dD1
dyA0
=  
k
uA1

D1
< 0;
duD1
dD1
dD1
dyA0
> 0
dA0
dyA0
=
k
uD1
f + k
uA1

m+ k
uD1

D1
> 0;
duA0
dA0
dA0
dyA0
< 0
dA1
dyA0
=  
k
uD1

D1
< 0;
duA1
dA1
dA1
dyA0
> 0
db
dyA0
=
k
uD1
k
uA1

D1
> 0;
dg
dyA0
= 1  uA0 +
 
uA0   uA1
 db
dyA0
> 0
db
dyA0
  dg
dyA0
=
db
dyA0
 
1   uA0   uA1    1  uA0  < 0 most likely
dD1
dyA1
=  
k
uA0
f
D1
< 0;
duD1
dD1
dD1
dyA1
> 0
dA0
dyA1
=  
k
uD1
f
D1
< 0;
duA0
dA0
dA0
dyA1
> 0
dA1
dyA1
=
k
uD1
 + k
uA0

m+ k
uD1

D1
> 0;
duA1
dA1
dA1
dyA1
< 0;
db
dyA1
=
k
uD1
k
uA0
f
D1
> 0 where 1 >
k
uD1
k
uA0
f
D1
> 0;
dg
dyA1
=   1  e
 A1
1  (1  ) e A1 +

e A0
1  (1  ) e A0  
e A1
1  (1  ) e A1

db
dyA1
=   (1  uA0) +
 
uA1   uA0

1  db
dyA1

< 0
db
dyA0
  dg
dyA0
> 0
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8.3.2 General Shock
dD1
dy
=
k
uA0
k
uA1
D1
> 0;
duD1
dD1
dD1
dy
< 0
dA0
dy
=
k
uA1
k
uD1
D1
> 0 ;
duA0
dA0
dA0
dy
< 0
dA1
dy
=
k
uA0
k
uD1
D1
> 0 ;
duA1
dA1
dA1
dy
< 0
dD1
dy
>
dA1
dy
>
dA0
dy
db
dy
=
k
uA0
k
uA1
m+ k
uD1
k
uA1
 + k
uD1
k
uA0
f
D1
dg
dy
=
 
uA0   uA1
 db
dy
  1

=  
 
uA0   uA1

D1
k
uA0
k
uA1
k
uD1
< 0
db
dy
  dg
dy
=
db
dy
   uA0   uA1  dbdy   1

where
m =
uD1
1  (1  ) e D1
  (1  )  + b (1  )  uD2 2+(1 )e D
(1 (1 )e D)2k

(uA0 )
2
(1 (1 )e A0)k + (1  )
(uD1 )
2
(1 (1 )e D)k
< 0 unless uD1 is very high;
 =
b
 
uA0
2 2+(1 )e A0
1 (1 )e A0
2
k

(uA0 )
2
(1 (1 )e A0)k + (1  )
(uD1 )
2
(1 (1 )e D)k
> 0
f =
(1  )  uA1
1 (1 )e A1

(uA0 )
2
(1 (1 )e A0)k + (1  )
(uD1 )
2
(1 (1 )e D)k
> 0
For stability we need thatdD1db jD1 (b)
 > dD1db jb(D1 )
 = m+ kuD1 > 0
Then
D1 =
k
uA0
k
uA1

m+
k
uD1

+
k
uD1

k
uA1
 +
k
uA0
f

> 0
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8.3.3 Impact on unemployment distribution
When yD1 increases, the negative impact on unemployment of disadvantaged
workers is higher than the impact on advantaged workersunemployment
rate:
duD1dD1 d
D
1
dyD1
 > duA0dA0 d
A
0
dyD1
 i¤
k
uA0

k
uA1
+ f

+ k
uA1

D1
uD1
1  (1  ) e D1 >
  k
uA1
m
D1
uA0
1  (1  ) e A0
which is true as given stability is k
uD1
+m > 0 and k
uA0
> k
uD1
.
When yA0 increases the unemployment distribution becomes more un-
equal as uD1 increases and u
A
0 falls.
When yA1 increases, the unemployment distribution becomes more un-
equal:
duD1
dD1
dD1
dyA1
>
duA0
dA0
dA0
dyA1
i¤
k
uA0
f
D1
uD1
1  (1  ) e D1 >
k
uD1
f
D1
uA0
1  (1  ) e A0
true as uD1 > u
A
0 .
When all productivity levels increase then unemployment distribution
become more equal:
duD1dD1 d
D
1
dy
 > duA0dA0 d
A
0
dy
  i¤
uD1
1  (1  ) e D1
k
uA0
k
uA1
D1
>
uA0
1  (1  ) e A0
k
uA1
k
uD1
D1
which holds.
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8.4 Targeted policy
The equilibrium equations are
yD1   b
1  (1  ) e D1  1 + D1 e D1   k = 0;
yA0   b
1  (1  ) e A0  1 + A0 e A0   k = 0;
yA1   b
1  (1  ) e A1  1 + A1 e A1   k = 0;
 (1  )  yA1   yD1  1
1 (1 )e D1
(uD1 )
2
k
 1
1 (1 )e A0
(uA0 )
2
k + (1  ) 1
1 (1 )e D1
(uD1 )
2
k
= b;
c+
 
yA0
1  e A0
1  (1  ) e A0 + b
e 
A
0
1  (1  ) e A0   k
A
0

1  (1  ) e A0
!
 
 
yA1
1  e D1
1  (1  ) e D1 + b
e 
D
1
1  (1  ) e D1   k
D
1

1  (1  ) e D1
!
= g:
8.4.1 Skill biased shocks
Di¤erentiating the equilibrium equations with respect to D1 ; 
A
0 ,b; g,y
A
0 and
yD1 gives:
dD1
dyD1
=
k
uA0
+ + k
uA0
 
yA1   yD1

D2
> 0;
duD1
dD1
dD1
dyD1
< 0;
dA0
dyD1
=  
  + k
uD1
 
yA1   yD1

D2
> 0;
duA0
dD1
dA0
dyD1
< 0;
dA1
dyD1
=
uA1
k
k
uA0
  + k
uD1
 
yA1   yD1

D2
> 0;
duA1
dyD1
dA1
dyD1
< 0;
db
dyD1
=   k
uA0
  + k
uD1
 
yA1   yD1

D2
< 0;
dg
dyD1
=  
 
yA1   yD1

uD
1  (1  ) e D
0@ kuA0

1 + 
uD1
k

+ 
D2
1A+  yA1   yDuD1
1  (1  ) e D1
uD1
k
+
 
uA0   uD1
! db
dyD1
< 0;
 dbdyD1
   dgdyD1
 =  dbdyD1

 
1 
  
yA1   yD

uD1
1  (1  ) e D1
uD1
k
+
 
uA0   uD1
!!   yA1   yD1 uD
1  (1  ) e D
0@ kuA0

1 + 
uD1
k

+ 
D2
1A
as

1 +  u
D
k

> 0 by the stability condition.
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dD1
dyA0
=   
D2
< 0;
duD1
dA0
dD1
dyA0
> 0;
dA0
dyA0
=
 + k
uD1
D2
> 0;
duA0
dA0
dA0
dyA0
< 0;
dA1
dyA0
=  u
A
1
k
 k
uD1
D2
< 0;
duA1
dyA1
dA1
dyA0
> 0;
db
dyA0
=
 k
uD1
D2
> 0;
dg
dyA0
= 1  uD1 +
 
uD1   uA0

1  db
dyA0

 
 
yA1   yD1

uD1
1  (1  ) e D1
dD1
dyA0
> 0;
db
dyA0
  dg
dyA0
=
db
dyA0
   1  uD1    uD1   uA0 1  dbdyA0

+
 
yA1   yD1

uD1
1  (1  ) e D1
dD1
dyA0
dD1
dyA1
=   k
uA0
 
yA1   yD1

D2
< 0;
duD1
dA1
dD1
dyA1
> 0;
dA0
dyA1
=   k
uD1
 
yA1   yD1

D2
< 0;
duA0
dA1
dA0
dyA1
> 0;
dA1
dyA1
=
uA1
k
D2    kuD1
 
yA1   yD1

D2
> 0 unless
 
yA1   yD1

is very big;
db
dyA1
=
k
uA0
k
uD1
D2
 
yA1   yD1

> 0;
dg
dyA1
=
 
uA0   uD1 +
 
yA1   yD1

uD
1  (1  ) e D
@D
@yD
!
db
dyA1
   1  uD1  ;
db
dyA1
  dg
dyA1
=
db
dyA1
 
 
uA0   uD1 +
 
yA1   yD1

uD
1  (1  ) e D
@D
@yD
!
db
dyA1
+
 
1  uD1

most likely pos.
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8.4.2 General Shock
dD1
dy
=
k
uA0
1
D2
> 0;
duD1
dD1
dD1
dy
< 0
dA0
dy
=
k
uD1
1
D2
> 0;
duA0
dA0
dA0
dy
< 0
dA1
dy
=
uA1
uA0
k
uD1
1
D2
> 0;
duA1
dA1
dA1
dy
< 0
db
dy
=
k
uA0
 + k
uD1

D2
< 0;
dg
dy
=   k
uA0
k
uD1
1
D2
  
uA0   uD+  yA1   yD1 uD1
1  (1  ) e D1
@D
@yD1
!
< 0;
db
dy
  dg
dy
=
k
uA0
 + k
uD1

D2
+
k
uA0
k
uD1
1
D2
  
uA0   uD+  yA1   yD1 uD1
1  (1  ) e D1
@D
@yD1
!
where
 =
b
 
uA0
2 2+(1 )e A0
1 (1 )e A0
2
k
 1
1 (1 )e A0
(uA0 )
2
k + (1  ) 1
1 (1 )e D1
(uD)2
k
> 0;
 =  
2+(1 )e D
1 (1 )e D b
1
(uD1 )
2
(uA0 )
2
(1 (1 )e A0)
 1
1 (1 )e A0
(uA0 )
2
k + (1  ) 1
1 (1 )e D1
(uD)2
k
< 0
and D2 = kuA0

 + k
uD1

+  k
uD1
> 0. The determinant is positive as for
stability we needdD1db jD1 (b)
 > dD1db jb(D1 )
()  + kuD1

> 0:
8.4.3 Impact on unemployment distribution
When yD1 increases, then the impact on unemployment of disadvantaged
workers is higher than that of advantaged workers
duD1dD1 d
D
1
dyD1
 >  duA0dD1 d
D
0
dyD1

k
uA0
+ + k
uA0
 
yA1   yD1

 D
uD1
1  (1  ) e D1 >
  + k
uD1
 
yA1   yD

 D
uA0
1  (1  ) e A0
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true as k
uA0
+  > k
uD1
+  > 0 by stability.
Unemployment distribution becomes more unequal when yA0 increases as
uD1 increases and u
A
0 falls.
When yA1 increases then unemployment distribution becomes more un-
equal:
duD1
dD1
dD1
dyA1
>
duA0
dA0
dA0
dyA1
i¤
k
uA0
 
yA1   yD

 D
uD1
1  (1  ) e D1 >
uA0
1  (1  ) e A0
k
uD1
 
yA1   yD

 D ;
which is true as uA0 < u
D
1
Impact of a general shock: unemployment distribution becomes more
equal duD1dD1 d
D
1
dy
 > duA0dA0 d
A
0
dy
 i¤
k
uA0
1
D2
uD1
1  (1  ) e D1 >
k
uD1
1
D2
uA0
1  (1  ) e A0 ;
which is true.
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